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Introduction
A. Arbitrability
A leading contemporary expert in arbitration has
explained: "The concept of arbitrability determines the
point at which the experience of contractual freedom ends
and the public mission of adjudication begins. In effect,
it establishes a dividing line between the transactional
pursuit of private rights and courts' role as custodians and
interpreters of the public interest." 1 A major part of the
arbitrability doctrine deals with the kind of claims that
can fall within the scope of agreements for private dispute
resolution
.
2
The principal reason behind the distinction is that
regulatory statutes contain special safeguards and remedies
and proscribe conduct for the good of society. Therefore,
these laws should not be applied and interpreted by private
tribunals and adjudicators. The litigation of statutory
Thomas E. Carbonneau & Francois Janson, Cartesian Logic and
Frontier Politics : French and American Concepts of Arbitrability,
2 Tul. J. Int'l & Comp. L. 193, 194 (1994)
Edward M. Morgan, Contract Theory and the Sources of Rights: An
Approach to the Arbitrability Question, 60 S. Cal . Rev. 1059,
1059 (1987)
2claims in public judicial forums and according to
established procedures guarantees public debate and
accountability and allows the laws to develop dynamically in
response to change in the social and political order.
Statutory claims, therefore, can be considered as
inarbitrable because they implicate the vital principles
upon which social organization was erected. 3
B. History of Dispute over Arbitrability
The arbitral process has a long history. Very early,
man, in his search of peace and justice, had resorted to
arbitration. Long before law was established, or courts
were organized or judges had formulated principles of law,
arbitration has been used for the resolving of discord, the
adjustment of differences, and the settlement of disputes. 4
Arbitration clauses are an integral part of the
parties' transactions. Nevertheless, the American judiciary
historically has refused to enforce arbitration agreements,
following the English precedent. English courts, jealously
guarding their dispute resolution monopoly, traditionally
refused to enforce agreements to arbitrate on the ground
Thomas E. Carbonneau & Francois Janson, supra note 1, at 196
Frances Kellor, American Arbitration, its History, Functions
and Achievements, 1, 3 (1948); Henri P. deVries, International
3that such agreements ousted the courts from their
jurisdiction. Despite that fact, members of organized
commercial groups have long favored arbitration. In self-
contained groups traditional sanctions for refusing to honor
an arbitration award were disciplinary proceedings or
expulsion, rather than court action. 5
To remedy the anachronism of the American law, Congress
enacted the Federal Arbitration Act of 1925 6 (hereinafter
"FAA"), which was the result of lobbying efforts of
merchants and attorneys. It grants to United States courts
the power to enforce arbitral agreements, to stay litigation
pending the outcome of arbitration, and to confirm arbitral
Arbitration: A Contractual Substitute for National Courts, 57
Tul. L. Rev. 42, 43 (1982)
Stephen P. Bedell et al., Arbitrability: Current Developments
in the Interpretation and Enforceability of Arbitration
Agreements, 13 J. Contemp. L. 1, 1 & 2 (1987); Jeffrey W.
Stempel, A Better Approach to Arbitrability, 65 Tul. L. Rev.
1377, 1379 (1991); Earl Wolaver, The Historical Background of
Commercial Arbitration, 83 U. Pa. L. Rev. 132, 138 (1934);
Allison, Arbitration Agreements and Antitrust Claims: The Need
for Enhanced Accommodation of Conflicting Public Policies, 64
N.C.L. Rev. 219, 222 (1986); Allison, Arbitration of Private
Antitrust Claims in International Trade: A Study in the
Subordination of National Interests to the Demands of a World
Market, 18 N.Y.U. J. Int' 1 L.& Pol. 361, 369 (1986); Michael R.
Voorhees, International Commercial Arbitration and the
Arbitrability of Antitrust Claims: Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v.
Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, 14 N. Ky . L. Rev. 65, 66 (1987); See
Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 105 S. Ct. 1238, 1242 n.6
(1985) (quoting H. R. REP. NO. 96, 68 th Cong., 1 st Sess. 1-2
(1924)
6 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (1993) (effective Jan. 1, 1926); The Congress
adopted the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of
Foreign Arbitral Awards in 1970 (June 10, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 2518,
T.I.A.S. No. 6997, 330 U.N.T.S. 38) and implemented it by passing
Chapter 2 of the FAA, codified as 9 U.S.C. §§ 201-08 (1982)
4awards. A long line of cases have held that this Act
creates a body of federal substantive law to be applied by
state and federal courts alike. It legitimized the
contractual recourse to arbitration and ended a longstanding
practice of judicial hostility toward arbitration. The FAA
was based on "the pragmatic beliefs that merchants have the
right to seek commercially-adapted brand of justice for
contractual disputes and that elaborate judicial proceedings
are not necessary in self-regulating private sectors". 8
The FAA provides that a written agreement to arbitrate
in any "contract evidencing a transaction involving commerce
... shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon
such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation
of any contract". The FAA further directs that "any party
aggrieved by the improper refusal of another party to
commence arbitration may petition a federal court of
See Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395
(1967), Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital v. Mercury Construction
Corp., 460 U.S. 1 (1983); The Supreme Court went even further in
Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984), which held
contrary state law is preempted by the Federal Arbitration Act
when interstate commerce is involved.
Stephen P. Bedell et al., supra note 5, at 2; Thomas E.
Carbonneau & Francois Janson, supra note 1, at 202; Jeffrey W.
Stempel, supra note 5, at 1380; Lisa M. Ferri, International
Arbitration - Commerce - Arbit rability of Antiutrust Claims from
International Commercial Disputes Recognized under Federal
Arbitration Act - Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-
Plymouth, Inc., 105 S. Ct. 3346 (1985), 17 Seton Hall L. Rev.
448, 453 (1987)
5competent jurisdiction for an order compelling
arbitration"
.
9
Despite this explicit federal statutory requirement,
many authorities have continued to accord arbitration
clauses a lesser status than other contract terms and have
failed to provide coherent and fair enforcement of
arbitration agreements. These courts have posited that the
judiciary may, in its discretion, refuse to enforce
arbitration clauses in order to preserve exclusive federal
jurisdiction over certain claims, 10 or to better implement
the policies of other federal statutes. 11 12
The analysis in this thesis will demonstrate the trend
of the U.S. courts towards widening the scope of the
arbitrability of disputes arising from claims based on
public policy oriented statutes. Particular emphasis will be
Stephen P. Bedell et al., supra note 5, at 3; Jeffrey W.
Stempel, supra note 5, at 1380
10 See, e.g., Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 726 F.2d 552
(9 th Cir. 1984), rev'd, 105 S. Ct . 1238 (1985); Belke v. Merrill,
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 693 F.2d 1023 (11 th Cir. 1982);
Miley v. Oppenheimer & Co., 637 F.2d 318 (5 th Cir. 1981) (all
refusing to enforce arbitration clauses as to arbitrable claims
to preserve exclusive federal jurisdiction over related federal
securities claims)
See, e.g., Applied Digital Technology v. Continental Casualty
Co., 576 F.2d 116 (7 th Cir. 1978); Allegaert v. Perot, 548 F.2d
432 (2d Cir.), cert, denied, 432 U.S. 910 (1977); Merryll Lynch,
Pierce, Fenner & Smith v. Moore, 590 F.2d 823 (10 th Cir. 1978);
S.A. Mineracao da Trinidade-Samitri v. Utah International, Inc.,
576 F. Supp. 566 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (holding arbitration clauses
unenforceable in the areas of antitrust, bankruptcy, 10b-5
claims, and RICO respectively)
6given to federal antitrust, securities regulation, and
bankruptcy law.
12 Stephen P. Bedell et al., supra note 5, at 2; Jeffrey W.
Stempel, supra note 5, at 1379
Chapter I
Basic Tools for
the Doctrine of Arbitrability
The United States federal courts have developed a number of
rules in their analysis of the arbitrability of statute-
based claims. An explanation of these rules is essential in
understanding the outcome of cases involving the
arbitrability of claims.
A. Presumption of Arbitrability
The U.S. Supreme Court, discussing the arbitrability
of a ground for complaint under a collective bargaining
agreement in United Steelworkers of America v. Warrior &
Gulf Navigation Co. 13 , stated that "an order to arbitrate ...
should not be denied unless it may be said with positive
assurance that the arbitration clause is not susceptible of
an interpretation that covers the asserted dispute. Doubts
should be resolved in favor of coverage".
United Steelworkers of America v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation
Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960); This case is one of the trio of cases
known as Steelworkers' trilogy.
8This presumption of arbitrability has been extended in
non-labor contracts as well. In Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood
& Conklin Manufacturing Co. 14 , the U.S. Supreme Court
reviewed a case involving a commercial contract and ruled
that, under the FAA, the federal courts must effect both the
intent of the legislature and of the parties: "We hold
therefore, that ... a federal court may consider only issues
relating to the making and performance of the agreement to
arbitrate. In so concluding, we do not only honor the plain
meaning of the statute but also the unmistakably clear
congressional purpose that the arbitration procedure, when
selected by the parties to a contract, be speed and not
subject to delay and obstruction in the courts".
In Moses H. Cone Mem / 1 Hosp. v. Mercury Constr.
Corp
.
15
,
the Court held that there is a "liberal federal
policy favoring arbitration agreements. The Arbitration Act
establishes that, as a matter of federal law, any doubts
concerning the scope of arbitrable issues should be resolved
in favor of arbitration...". A number of other state and
federal courts, considering arbitrability in commercial
cases, have agreed that "ambiguous contract terms are to be
Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Manufacturing Co., 388
U.S. 395 (1967)
15 Moses H. Cone Mem' 1 Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1,
24-25 (1983)
9construed in favor of arbitrability where such construction
is not obviously contrary to the parties' intent...". 16
With questions concerning the scope of an arbitration
clause, courts begin with a presumption in favor of
arbitrability based on the mere existence of the written
arbitration clause and will rely on the presumption as long
as the scope of the clause is fairly debatable. Unless it
can be said with positive assurance that the instant dispute
does not fall within the arbitration agreement, arbitration
will be compelled or litigation stayed. 17
The presumption of arbitrability would allow courts to
avoid a detailed examination of the merits of the dispute.
Nevertheless, the presumption is rebuttable. In Lever
Brothers v. International Chemical Workers Union, Local
217 18
, the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit set up a
two-part test to determine whether a presumption of
arbitrability has been rebutted: the defending party must
_e Michael F. Hoellering, Arbitrability of Disputes, 41 Bus. Law.
125, 126 (1985); Univ. of Alaska v. Modern Constr., Inc., 522
P. 2d 1132, 1138 (Alaska 1974); Accord Acevedo Maldonado v. PPG
Indus., Inc., 514 F.2d 614 (1 st Cir. 1975); Georgia Power Co. v.
Cimarron Coal Corp., 526 F.2d 101 (6th Cir. 1975), cert, denied,
425 U.S. 952 (1975); Long v. Marion MFG. Co., 402 F. Supp . 69
(D.S.C. 1974), aff'd, 511 F.2d 1398 (4th Cir. 1975); Modern
Juniors, Inc. v. Spinnerin Yarn Co., 29 N.Y.2d 946, 280 N.E.2d
365, 329 N.Y.S.2d 578 (1972); Griffin v. Semperit of America,
Inc., 414 F. Supp. 1384 (S.D. Tex. 1976)
Jeffrey W. Stempel, supra note 5, at 1403; See, e.g., Mar-Len,
Inc. v. Parsons-Gilbane, 773 F.2d 633, 636 (5th Cir. 1985); Morgan
v. Smith Barney, Harris Upham & Co., 729 F.2d 1163 (8 tL Cir. 1984)
10
not only demonstrate that the particular type of grievance
being disputed was specifically excluded from the
arbitration clause, but also that the arbitration clause is
not reasonably susceptible of an interpretation that covers
the particular type of grievance being disputed. 19
B. Intertwining Doctrine
The federal circuits have split over the proper
administration of arbitrable claims which were factually and
legally intertwined with non-arbitrable claims.^
Generally, courts sever the arbitrable from the non-
arbitrable claims, ordering arbitration of the former and
judicial review of the latter. 21 However, if both
arbitrable and non-arbitrable claims arise out of the same
transaction, judicial authorities have questioned the wisdom
and practicality of severing the claims. The judiciary's
doubts have focused on both the inefficiency of bifurcated
Lever Bros. v. International Chem. Workers Union, Local 217,
554 F.2d 115, 119 (4 th Cir. 1976)
Paula L. McDonald, Judicial Interpretation of Collective
Bargaining Agreements : The Danger Inherent in the Determination
of Arbitrability, 1983 Duke L.J. 848, 874 (1983); Lever Bros. v.
International Chem. Workers Union, Local 217, 554 F.2d 115, 119
(4 th Cir. 1976) (presents a case of "not reasonably susceptible");
United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S.
574, 582-83 (1960) (presents a case of specific exclusion)
20 See infra notes 23-24 & 26-27
11
proceedings related to a single transaction, and concern for
the possible preclusive effect of factual issues resolved by
arbitration-
The Fifth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits 23 followed the
intertwining doctrine, as developed primarily by the Fifth
Circuit in Sibley v. Tandy Corp . 24 . The intertwining
doctrine provides that "when it is impractical if not
impossible to separate out non-arbitrable claims from
arbitrable claims, a court should deny arbitration in order
to preserve its exclusive jurisdiction over non-arbitrable
claims". 25
In contrast, the Sixth and Eighth Circuits 2 "3 followed
the Seventh Circuit and held that the FAA divests courts of
their discretion as to the arbitration of the arbitrable
-1 Belke 693 F.2d at 1027; Wick v. Atlantic Marine, Inc., 605 F.2d
166, 168 (5th Cir. 1979)
Belke, 693 F.2d at 1029; Miley v. Oppenheimer & Co., 637 F.2d
318, 334-37 (5th Cir. 1981); Byrd v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc.,
726 F.2d 552 (9"- r- Cir. 1984), rev'd, 105 S. Ct . 1238 (1985);
Cunningham v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 550 F. Supp. 578, 585
(E.D. Cal. 1982); Stephen P. Bedell et al., supra note 5, at 3 &
6
;
- Miley v. Oppenheimer & Co., 637 F.2d 318 (5th Cir. 1981); Byrd
v. Reynolds, Inc., 726 F.2d 552 (9th Cir. 1984), rev'd, 105 S. Ct.
1238 (1985); Belke v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 693
F.2d 1023 (11 th Cir. 1982)
24 Sibley v. Tandy Corp., 543 F.2d 540 (5th Cir. 1976)
Stephen P. Bedell et al., supra note 5, at 6
i Liskey v. Oppenheimer & Co., 717 F.2d 314 (6" Cir. 1983);
Surman v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 733 F.2d 59 (8 th
Cir. 1984)
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claims. In Dickinson v. Heinold Securities, Inc. "', the
Seventh Circuit analyzed the cases espousing the
intertwining doctrine and rejected their reasoning. The
court remarked that a stay of arbitration pending the
judicial review of non-arbitrable claims would avoid the
danger of preclusion, without violating the agreement of the
parties to arbitrate. Addressing the concern over judicial
efficiency, the court noted that the FAA does not identify
inefficiency as a bar to arbitration. 28
The Supreme Court finally resolved this split of
authority in Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd29 . This
case involved an individual, A. Lamar Byrd, who sold his
dental practice and invested the proceeds in securities
through a broker-dealer, Dean Witter Reynolds. Byrd opened
a trading account with Dean Witter Reynolds in which he
placed $160,000 for investment. The parties signed a
written agreement to arbitrate any claims arising out of the
account. The value of the account quickly declined by more
than $100,000 and Byrd ultimately filed suit in federal
district court, alleging violation of the Exchange Act and
various state statutes. Dean Witter sought to compel
arbitration of the state claims, conceding that the claims
Dickson v. Heinold Sec, Inc., 661 F.2d 638 (7 Ul Cir. 1981)
28 Stephen P. Bedell et al., supra note 5, at 7
29 Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 726 F.2d 552 (9 th Cir
1984), rev'd, 105 S. Ct. 1238 (1985;
13
under the Exchange Act were non-arbitrable. In accordance
with the intertwining doctrine, the district court denied
the motion to compel arbitration, and the Ninth Circuit
affirmed. The Ninth Circuit reasoned that the federal and
state claims were intertwined, and bifurcated proceedings
would frustrate the purpose of the FAA. 30
The Supreme Court held that a federal district court
may not deny a motion to compel arbitration of state law
claims under an arbitration agreement on the ground that the
claims are intertwined with non-arbitrable federal
securities claims. The Court concluded that the primary
purpose of the FAA was to ensure the enforcement of
arbitration agreement, not, as interpreted by the Ninth
Circuit, to ensure expeditious resolution of disputes. The
Court squarely held the intertwining doctrine to be invalid
in any context, thus requiring arbitration of arbitrable
claims without regard to their relationship to non-
arbitrable claims. 31
The modern view is the non-arbitrable issues will be
withheld from arbitration. In most of the cases, unless the
issues are so intertwined as to be inseparable, the court
30 Stephen P. Bedell et al., supra note 5, at 8
31 Id. at 5 & 8; Michael F. Hoellering, supra note 16, at 135
14
will stay resolution of such issues until arbitration of
other issues is complete. 32
C. Permeation Doctrine
The case law leaves little doubt that a dispute which
entails both arbitrable and non-arbitrable issues must, if
at all possible, be resolved in two different fora. 33 This
gives maximum effect to the parties' agreement to arbitrate,
without transplanting the non-arbitrable questions to a
private arena. However, this approach does not address the
question of what to do when two distinct causes of action
are so closely related as to make resolution of one
impossible without significant (and possibly determinative)
findings in the other. Several courts have adopted what has
been termed the "permeation" doctrine, according to which an
action to compel arbitration is stayed if non-arbitrable
issues are inseparable from the arbitrable ones to an extent
that the arbitrable findings would have "a collateral
estoppel effect" on the litigation of the non-arbitrable
claims. 34 This doctrine has been explained by Judge Posner
J
^ Michael F. Hoellering, supra note 16, at 128
33 See University Life Ins. Co. v. Unimarc Ltd., 699 F.2d 846,
850-15 {l zr- Cir. 1983)
34 See, e.g., Dickinson v. Heinold Sec, Inc., 661 D.2d 638, 642-
45 {l zti Cir. 1981) (federal securities law issue not arbitrable);
15
in terms of efficiency: the prior resolution of the
litigated issues is designed to avoid judicial
reconsideration of arbitral findings and thereby to "produce
the quickest, soundest resolution of the complete
controversy between the parties". 35
Cobb v. Lewis, 488 F.2d 41, 47-50 (5th Cir. 1974) (antitrust
issues not arbitrable)
University Life, 699 F.2d at 851; Edward M. Morgan, supra note
2, at 1080-81
Chapter II
The Doctrine of Arbitrability
Arbitration, arising as a product of private
negotiation, is characterized by the Supreme Court as a
creature of contract 36 . Accordingly, the legitimacy of
arbitral proceedings flows directly from a vision of private
autonomy as the conceptual basis of contract law. 3. Thus,
parties may elect to arbitrate virtually any dispute.
Certain statutory enactments, however, designed to
protect the interest of the public, have been interpreted as
precluding the arbitration of claims raised under them. In
general, these are statutes that reserve jurisdiction over a
particular dispute to the courts, such as the Securities Act
of 1933; the Bankruptcy Code, which reguires all claims to
come before the bankruptcy court; certain state laws which
prohibit any waiver of a party's right to bring suit; and
judge-made law, such as the non-arbitrability of domestic
See, e.g., AT&T Tech., Inc. v. Communications Workers of Am.,
475 U.S. 643 (1986); Drake Batteries, Inc. v. Local 50, American
Bakery & Confectionary Workers Int'l, 370 U.S. 254 (1962);
Atkinson v. Sinclair Refining Co., 370 U.S. 238 (1962); United
Steelworkers of Am. v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S.
574 (1960)
31 Edward M. Morgan, supra note 2, at 1069
16
17
antitrust issues.'3. These cases are better viewed as public
policy exception cases and not statutory conflict cases, as
is explained below. 39
The FAA permits rescission where the arbitration clause
itself was a product of fraud, coercion or where there exist
"such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the
revocation of any contract". Notwithstanding the reality of
economic life, courts frequently show no great concern over
the quality of consent attending arbitration agreements. In
many case reports courts state that arbitration clauses may
be set aside on standard common-law grounds. But courts so
seldom find these grounds or give them serious discussion
that one must inevitably conclude that courts generally
treat the arbitration text as the irrefutable embodiment of
agreement
.
40
Despite showing little inclination to address contract
questions, courts have been willing to adopt public policy
exceptions, removing whole categories of claims from the
FAA, for fear of potential contracting abuse. The public
; Michael F. Hoellering, supra note 16, at 128
Jeffrey W. Stempel, Pitfalls of Public Policy: The Case of
Arbitration Agreements, 22 St. Mary's L.J. 259, at 283-335 (1990)
40 Jeffrey W. Stempel, supra note 5, at 1388, 1390 & 1408; See,
e.g., Glimer v. Interstate/ Johnson Lane Corp., 895 F.2d 195 (4 th
Cir.) aff'd U.S.L.W. (May 13, 1991); Nicholson v. CPC Int'l,
Inc., 877 F.2d 221 (3d Cir. 1989); Swenson v. Management
Recruiters Int'l, Inc., 858 F.2d 1304 (8 th Cir. 1988), cert,
denied, 110 S. Ct . 143 (1989); Steck v. Smith Barney, Harris
18
policy exception to arbitrability, when invoked, precludes
enforcement of claims that the party clearly agreed to
arbitrate. The rationale for the policy exceptions is more
accurately described as based on either a preference for
litigation or an attempt to aid the less powerful
contracting party by preventing relegation to a less
advantageous forum when circumstances suggest that the party
did not adequately consent or consented to a forum so
disadvantageous that the court will not enforce the
bargain. 41
A. Arbitrability and State Law
1) Principle of Enforceability
Arbitrability problems occasionally arise when a state
attempts to preclude arbitration and insists on a judicial
remedy, on statutory or public policy grounds, but the
moving party argues for arbitration. 42
The U.S. Supreme Court ruled on this question in
Southland Corp. v. Keating 43 . This case involved a dispute
Upham & Co., 661 F. Supp. 543 (D.N.J. 1987); Southland Corp. v.
Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984)
41 Jeffrey W. Stempel, supra note 5, at 1393-95
42 Michael F. Hoellering, supra note 16, at 130
43 Southland Corp. v. Keating, 104 S. Ct . 852 (1984
19
between a class of California 7-11 franchisees and Southland
Corp., the Texas-based owner of 7-11. The franchise
agreements all contained a provision for arbitration of any
disputes arising thereunder. The franchisees sought to
avoid arbitration, alleging that the contracts were
adhesive, and filed a class action suit in California state
court under California's franchise investment law. 44
The U.S. Supreme Court held that the FAA rests on the
authority of the Congress to enact substantive rules under
the commerce clause. Congress declared a national policy
favoring arbitration and withdrew the power of the States to
reguire a judicial forum for the resolution of claims which
the contracting parties agreed to solve by arbitration. The
court stressed that nothing in the F7AA indicated that the
broad principle of enforceability was subject to any
limitations under state law. 45
2) The Adhesion Contract
The U.S. Constitution provides states the right to
promulgate laws governing many areas of law, including
arbitration. 46 Although the F7AA does not explicitly address
"" Michael F. Hoellering, supra note 16, at 130
45 Id. at 131
46 Id. at 130
20
the limits of that power, section 2 leaves states with the
lai power to define the grounds which may invalidate_ d ^ ^ .
.
any contract, including an agreement to arbitrate."1
lie arbitration of claims by consumers against business
entities presents a special problem in arbitrability . As a
cetera! matter, a dispute between a consumer and a
corporation is no less arbitrable than a purely commercial
dispute between two companies. In reality, however,
consumers of retail goods or services usually stand in a
different position than other parties to an arbitration
agreement. Consumers often sign a standard form contract,
arguably an adhesion contract, without having negotiated the
specific terms of the arbitration agreement. They may not
read the arbitration agreement; or if they do read it, they
may not understand it. Thus consumers, in contrast to more
sophisticated parties, may argue that consumers lack full
information and sufficiently egual bargaining power. In an
attempt to protect consumers, state courts and legislatures
have adoptee rules intended to prevent unfair bargaining. -1 '
In Allied-Bruce Termirix Cos. v. Dobson 4 ", the U.S.
Supreme Court held that section 2 "gives States a method for
protecting consumers against unfair pressure to agree to a
Josephh T. Mclaughlin, Arbitrability: Current Trends in the
United Szazes, 59 Alb. L. Rev. 905, 923 (1996)
M Joseph T. Mclaughlin, supra note 47, at 921-22
21
contract with an unwanted arbitration clause", by permitting
states to regulate contracts, including arbitration
agreements, in traditional ways (e.g., defining grounds,
such as duress, which would invalidate any contract).
However, state power in this regard is severely limited with
respect to arbitration agreements. Because of the supremacy
of the FAA favoring arbitration, states cannot place an
arbitration agreement on an "unequal footing" and subject it
to more stringent scrutiny than any other contract.
Terminix continued the trend in the federal courts of
rejecting state legislative efforts to impose special notice
requirements about arbitration in contracts between
consumers and sellers. 30
In Cohen v, Wedbush, Noble, Cooke, Inc. 1 ', the federal
court found that adhesion itself does not appear to
constitute a sufficient basis for invalidating arbitration
agreements. Rather the adhesive nature of a contract or
arbitration provision is occasionally invoked to support the
court's holding based on other arbitrability defenses such
as procedural unconscionability or public policy,. 5 "
49 Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 115 S. Ct . 834 (1995)
=0 Joseph T. Mclaughlin, supra note 47, at 923
Dl Cohen v. Wedbush, Noble, Cooke, Inc., 841 F.2d 282, 286 (9th
Cir. 1988)
Jeffrey W. Stempel, supra note 5, at 1413-14; See, e.g.,
Moseley v. Electronic & Missile Facilities, Inc., 374 U.S. 167
(1963); Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427 (1953); Boyd v. Grand Trunk
22
B. Federal Antitrust Legislation
1) Traditional Doctrine on Arbitrability
The federal antitrust laws are concerned with the
promotion of free and unfettered competition in the
marketplace, as well as the prohibition of certain types of
anticompetitive practices. 5 The antitrust laws are viewed
by many as the guardians of free competition and economic
efficiency, both of which are key components of a
capitalistic market economy and a democratic society.
Because antitrust disputes often involve strong underlying
policy implications, such claims have traditionally been
treated by the courts as requiring purely judicial
resolution. 54
Arbitration in the antitrust area seems to raise the
biggest problems. Notwithstanding the lack of specific
support for this practice in the Sherman Act, courts
traditionally refused to enforce agreements to arbitrate
W.R. Co., 338 U.S. 263 (1949); AAACon Auto Transp., Inc. v. State
Farm Mut . Auto Ins. Co, 537 F.2d 648 (2d Cir. 1976), cert.
denied, 429 U.S. 1042 (1977); Miller v. AAACon Auto Transp., Inc.
434 F. Supp. 40 (S.D. Fla. 1977), aff'd mem., 614 F.2d 292 (5" h
Cir.), cert, denied, 449 U.S. 918 (1980)
See Phillip Areeda, Antitrust Analysis, §§ 103-106 (2d ed.
1974)
Eric James Fuglsang, The Arbitrability of Domestic Antitrust
Disputes: Where Does the Law Stand?, 46 DePaul L. Rev. 779, 780 &
94 (1997)
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antitrust claims. 3 The refusal to enforce arbitration
agreements as to antitrust disputes was known as the
American Safety doctrine. 50
One of the most often-used arguments for non-
arbitrability of antitrust issues was that antitrust can
never be a private matter but must always be open to the
public. The plaintiff then acts as a private Attorney
General. The case American Safety Equipment Corp. v. J. P.
Maguire & Co. 5 involved a typical licensing agreement
whereby the licensor granted the licensee the rights to use
its trademark. The parties' licensing agreement contained a
broad arbitration clause. After the business relationship
deteriorated, the licensee filed suit alleging that the
licensing agreement violated the Sherman Act and sought a
declaratory judgment stating that the agreement was illegal.
The licensor sought to stay the litigation pending the
outcome of arbitration. 58
The district court granted the licensor' s motion to
stay the litigation and ordered the parties to arbitrate the
55 See, e.g., Hunt v. Mobil Oil Corp., 410 F. Supp. 10 (S.D.N.Y.
1976), aff'd, 550 F.2d 68 (2d Cir.), cert, denied, 434 U.S. 984
(1977); Cobb v. Lewis, 488 F.2d 41 (5 r- n Cir. 1974); Helfenbein v.
International Industries, Inc., 438 F.2d 1068 (8 th Cir.), cert,
denied, 404 U.S. 872 (1971)
56 Stephen P. Bedell et al
.
, supra note 5, at 16
American Safety Equipment Corp. v. J. P. Maguire & Co., 391 F.2d
821 (2d Cir. 1968)
58 Eric James Fuglsang, supra note 54, at 798
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dispute, including the antitrust claims. 3 The appellate
court reversed, ruling that "claims under the antitrust laws
are not merely a private matter. The Sherman Act is
designed to promote the national interest in a competitive
economy; thus the plaintiff asserting his rights under the
Act has been likened to a private attorney-general who
protects the public's interest ... The persuasive public
interest in enforcement of the antitrust laws, and the
nature of the claims that arise in such cases, combine to
make the outcome here clear ... We conclude that the antitrust
claims raised here are inappropriate for arbitration." 60
The American Safety view that antitrust disputes are
not arbitrable is based on four primary considerations:
1) The protection of weak parties because of the
"strong possibility" that the commercial contracts that
generate antitrust disputes might be contracts of
adhesion.
2) "The issues in antitrust cases are prone to be
complicated, and the evidence extensive and diverse,
far better suited to judicial than to arbitration
procedures"
.
3) The "questionable propriety" of entrusting antitrust
decision-making to commercial arbitrators, who are
American Safety Equipment Corp. v. J. P. Maguire & Co., 391 F.2d
821 (2d Cir. 1968)
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"frequently men drawn for their business expertise"
when "it is the business community generally that is
regulated by the antitrust laws".
4) An other concern is also one of public policy. "A
claim under the antitrust laws is rot merely a private
matter ... Antitrust violations can affect hundreds of
thousands - perhaps millions - of people ar.d inflict,
staggering economic damage". The function of antitrust
law is to establish a certain economic order, and its
goals go beyond the interests of the private parties
involved in antitrust litigation. 01
An exception to the general rule of non-arbitrability
for antitrust claims arose shortly thereafter in Cobb v.
Lewis '^. The Fifth Circuit upheld the general policy of
non-arbitrability as applied tc antitrust claims, but
recognized that agreements to arbitrate antitrust that were
entered into after the dispute had arisen were enforceable.
In reaching this conclusion, the court relied on dictum in
American Safety leaving open the issue of the enforceability
of post-dispute agreements tc arbitrate antitrust disputes,
' Michael F. Hoellering, supra note 16, at 136
Thomas J. Brewer, The Arbitrability of Antitrust Disputes
:
Freedom to Contract for an Alternative Forum, 66 Antitrust L.J.
91, 92 (1997); Ludwig Von Zumbusch, Arcizrability of Antitrust
Claims under U.S., German, and EEC Law: The 'International
Transaction' Criterion and Public Policy, 22 Tex. Int'l L.J. 291,
292 (1987); Michael R. Voorhees, supra note 5, at 70
62 Cobb v. Lewis, 48 8 F.2d 41 (5"- r- Cir. 1974)
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as well as relying on several securities cases 63 that upheld
similar post-dispute agreements to arbitrate. However, the
Cobb court specifically noted that, in order to be
enforceable, such agreements must be expressly made and must
refer specifically to the controversy in question. Such
post-dispute agreements to arbitrate cannot be deduced
simply from the presence of an arbitration clause in the
original contract. Notwithstanding the Cobb_exception for
post-dispute agreements to arbitrate, antitrust disputes
generally remain non-arbitrable .
°
4
2) Arbitration of Antitrust Issues
in International Transactions
The domestic non-arbitrability policy applied to
antitrust issues was rejected as inapplicable to
international trade by the U.S. Supreme Court in Mitsubishi
Motor Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth Corp. 65 Mitsubishi, a
Japanese corporation, manufactures automobiles for Chrysler
International (CISA) , a Swiss corporation. Soler, a car
63 Moran v. Paine, Webber, Jackson & Curtis, 389 F.2d 242 (3d Cir.
1968); Coenen v. R.W. Pressprich & Co., 453 F.2d 1209 (2d Cir.
1972) (in both cases, arbitration agreements were held
enforceable when made after the dispute had arisen)
64 Eric James Fuglsang, supra note 54, at 800
Mitsubishi Motor Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth Corp., 473
U.S. 614 (1985)
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dealer in Puerto Rico, entered into a distributorship
agreement with CISA for the sale of Mitsubishi manufactured
vehicles in Puerto Rico. These vehicles were to be supplied
directly to Soler by Mitsubishi. A minimum sales volume was
set by Mitsubishi and agreed to by Soler. The distributor
agreement called for arbitration of any disputes in Japan
under the rules of the Japan Commercial Arbitration
Association. Soler was unable to meet sales quotas because
of the suddenly soft auto sales market of 1981. Soler then
sought permission to ship the cars to the continental United
States and to Latin America. The manufacturer denied the
request, stating that the automobiles manufactured for Soler
in Puerto Rico did not meet standards in those markets.
Mitsubishi then sought recovery of storage charges and other
penalties on cars ordered by, but not shipped to, Soler and
also sought to compel arbitration according to the contract.
It further commenced arbitration proceedings in Japan. In
its answer, Soler denied the allegations and counterclaimed
on the ground that Mitsubishi had breached the contract, had
defamed Soler, and had violated the Sherman Antitrust Act.
It based the latter claim on the allegations that both
Mitsubishi and CISA had unlawfully conspired to divide
markets in restraint of trade and that Mitsubishi refused to
28
ship cars or parts which would have enabled Soler to sell in
the continental United States. 66
The federal district court determined that the federal
antitrust issues fell within the scope of the parties'
broadly drafted arbitration agreement but recognized that,
under the American Safety doctrine, such issue were normally
"of character inappropriate for enforcement by arbitration."
The district court, relying on Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co.
(cf. infra C.ii)), nonetheless held "that the international
character of the Mitsubishi-Soler undertaking required
enforcement of the agreement to arbitrate even as to the
antitrust claims". 07 The U.S. Court of Appeal for the First
Circuit agreed that the federal antitrust claims fell within
the scope of the parties' arbitration clause but concluded
that neither Scherk nor the New York Convention required
abandonment of the American Safety doctrine. The court also
distinguished Scherk, which held that claims arising under
the federal securities laws are arbitrable in an
international context. The First Circuit reasoned that the
public policy interests protected by private enforcement of
the antitrust laws are more important than those protected
Monroe Leigh, Federal Arbitration Act - Convention of the
Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards
Arbitrability of Antitrust Claims Arising from an International
Transaction, 80 Am. J. Int'l L. 168, 168 (1986); Michael F.
Hoellering, supra note 16, at 137; Ludwig Von Zumbusch, supra
note 61, at 295
^ Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 621
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by the securities laws. The court reasoned that the policy
underlying the securities laws is to protect investors while
the policy behind antitrust laws 'is not to protect
individual companies, but to protect competition. An
example of the importance of the public interest in private
enforcement, in the court's view, is that successful
antitrust plaintiffs recover treble damages, while
securities plaintiffs only recover actual damages. 68
Accordingly, the First Circuit reversed the district court
regarding the antitrust claims, stating that antitrust
disputes were non-arbitrable under the American Safety
doctrine. Mitsubishi appealed. 69
The Supreme Court ruled that since the contract was
international, the antitrust issues were arbitrable.
Relying on cases such as The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore
Co. 70 and Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co. 71 (cf. infra C.ii)),
the Court emphasized the importance of the international
commercial context and the need for dependability and
honesty in facilitating international trade and stated: "We
conclude that concerns of international comity, respect for
68 Lisa M. Ferri, supra note 8, at 452; Mitsubishi, 723 F.2d at
168
Eric James Fuglsang, supra note 54, at 802; Thomas J. Brewer,
supra note 61, at 95
70 The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1 (1964)
:?1 Scherk v. Alberto-Culver, 417 U.S. 506 (1974)
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the capacities of foreign and transnational tribunals, and
sensitivity to the need of the international commercial
system of predictability in the resolution of disputes
require that we enforce the parties' agreement, even
assuming that a contrary result would be forthcoming in a
domestic context". 72
Declaring that "we are well past the time when judicial
suspicion of the desirability of arbitration and of the
competence of arbitral tribunal inhibited the development of
arbitration as an alternative means of dispute resolution",
the Court announced a two-step approach of determining the
arbitrability of claims arising under federal statutes:
First, a court must ascertain whether the parties
entered into an agreement to arbitrate the statutory claims
at issue. The Mitsubishi Court's discussion of this first
step of the analysis amounts to a newly articulated
presumption that statutory claims are proper subjects for
arbitration. Standard "all disputes" arbitration clauses
presumptively encompass statutory claims, such as antitrust
claims
.
Secondly, if it is found that the arbitration clause
agreed upon by the parties covers the statutory claims at
issue, the second step of the Mitsubishi analysis requires
the court to ascertain whether the text or legislative
Stephen P. Bedell et al .
,
supra note 5, at 17; Michael F.
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history of the statute in question indicates that Congress
intended arbitration to be precluded as an available
forum. 73
The Supreme Court also indirectly expressed its
skepticism about the validity of the doctrine of non-
arbitrability in the domestic context and its disagreement
with the reasoning on which American Safety was based.
The Court rejected the American Safety concern that
contracting parties who become involved in antitrust
disputes are likely to be bound by a contract of adhesion.
Considering the diverse range of contracts (e.g.,
distribution, franchising, licensing, and joint venture
agreements) that may link parties who become involved in
antitrust disputes, it is unreasonable to presume that all
such contracts are likely to be unconscionable adhesion
arrangements. As the Court noted, the mere fact that an
antitrust dispute arises does not "warrant invalidation of
the selected forum on the undemonstrated assumption that the
arbitration clause is tainted". Instead, a party resisting
arbitration may attack directly the validity of the
agreement to arbitrate. Moreover, the party may attempt to
challenge the forum-selection clause by showing that the
agreement was "affected by fraud, undue influence, or
Hoellering, supra note 16, at 137-38
73 Thomas J. Brewer, supra note 61, at 96
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overweening bargaining power"; that "enforcement would be
unreasonable and unjust"; or that proceedings "in the
contractual forum will be so gravely difficult and
inconvenient that the resisting party will for all practical
purposes be deprived of his day in court". But absent such
showing, there is no basis for assuming the forum inadequate
or its selection unfair.
The Court also rejected the American Safety view that
the complexity of antitrust disputes is against enforcing
agreements to arbitrate such disputes: "adaptability and
access to expertise are hallmarks of arbitration" and the
parties consciously chose a "manageable" procedure to handle
their disputes, however . complicated. The anticipated
subject matter of the dispute may be taken into account when
the arbitrators are appointed, and arbitral rules typically
provide for the participation of experts either employed by
the parties or appointed by the tribunal. Moreover, it is
often a judgment that simple proceedings and expeditious
results will best serve their needs that cause parties to
agree to arbitrate their disputes; it is typically desired
to limit the effort and expense required to resolve a
dispute, which leads the parties mutually to forgo access to
judicial remedies. In sum, the factor of potential
complexity alone does not persuade us that an arbitral
tribunal could not properly handle an antitrust matter.
33
The Court also rejected the notion that arbitration
panels composed of members of the business community would
be hostile to enforcing the restraints on business conduct
imposed by the antitrust statutes: "We decline to indulge
the presumption that the parties and arbitral body
conducting a proceeding will be unable or unwilling to
retain competent, conscientious, and impartial arbitrators".
Finally, the Court noted that "having permitted the
arbitration to go forward, the national courts of the United
States will have the opportunity at the award-enforcement
stage to ensure that the legitimate interest in the
enforcement of the antitrust laws have been addressed. The
New York Convention reserves to each signatory country the
right to refuse enforcement of an award where the
"recognition or enforcement of the award would be contrary
to the public policy of that country". 74
The decision in Mitsubishi set the stage for a reversal
of the judicial stance against the arbitrability of domestic
antitrust disputes. Although the Mitsubishi Court limited
its decision to an international sales agreement and
expressly declined to address agreement to arbitrate arising
from domestic transactions, the "logic and wide-ranging
nature" of the opinion strongly suggested that the same
Id. at 98; Michael F. Hoellering, supra note 16, at 13
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own precedent on this topic' 8 , the Ninth Circuit concluded
that the reasoning underlying American Safety had been
fatally undermined by the Supreme Court's decision in
Mitsubishi and that domestic antitrust disputes are subject
to arbitration: "Given the Mitsubishi Court's meticulous
step-by-step disembowelment of the American Safety doctrine,
this circuit will no longer follow American Safety. We hold
that Mitsubishi effectively overruled American Safety and
its progeny ..." , 19
Other courts have relied on a more traditional contract
analysis in approaching this issue by maintaining that
antitrust disputes are subject to arbitration only if they
fall within the scope of the contractual arbitration
clause. 80
In Coors Brewing Co. v. Molson Breweries 81 , the dispute
centered around a 1985 beer licensing agreement between
Coors, a Colorado company, and Molson, a Canadian company.
Nghiem v. NEC Electronic, Inc., 25 F.3d 1437 (9th Cir.), cert,
denied, 115 S. Ct . 638 (1994)
"
8 See Lake Communications, Inc. v. ICC Corp., 738 F.2d 1473 (9th
Cir. 1984) (held antitrust claims to be inarbitrable)
Eric James Fuglsang, supra note 54, at 805; Thomas J. Brewer,
supra note 61, at 104
Joseph T. Mclaughlin, supra note 47, at 937; Eric James
Fuglsang, supra note 54, at 805; See Santa Cruz Clinic v.
Dominican Santa Cruz Hosp., No C93 20613, 1995 WL 232410, at 2-3
(N.D. Cal. Apr. 17, 1995); Swensen' s Ice Cream Corp. v. Corsair
Corp., 942 F.2d 1307 (8 th Cir. 1991)
any
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arbitration poses to the public interest underlying
antitrust disputes. As a result, courts adopting this
philosophy continually refuse to compel arbitration of
domestic antitrust disputes, even where the parties to the
dispute are bound by contractual arbitration clauses that
may suggest otherwise. 84
Quite recently, a divided panel of the Eleventh
Circuit, in Kotam Electronics, Inc. v. JBL Consumer
Products, Inc. 85 , stating that the American Safety doctrine
had not yet been overruled, ruled that antitrust claims
arising in the domestic context remained inarbitrable and
reaffirmed the continuing validity of Cobb v. Lewis , in
which the Fifth Circuit specifically relied upon the
American Safety rationale in holding domestic antitrust
disputes inarbitrable. The dispute in Kotam concerned
dealer and distributorship agreements between the parties.
Each agreement contained a broad arbitration clause. When
the dispute arose, JBL sought to compel arbitration on the
theory that Mitsubishi overruled Cobb and thereby allowed
the arbitration of antitrust disputes.
83 See, e.g., Stendig Int'l, Inc. v. B.&B. Italia, S.P.A., 633 F.
Supp. 27 (S.D.N.Y. 1986)
Eric James Fuglsang, supra note 54, at 781
Kotam Elecs., Inc. v. JBL Consumer Prods., Inc., 59 F.3d 1155
(ll cn Cir. 1995)
86 Cobb v. Lewis, 488 F.2d 41 (5 th Cir. 1974)
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However, the Eleventh Circuit rejected this argument in
holding that pre-dispute agreements to arbitrate antitrust
claims remain unenforceable. Because the Eleventh Circuit
found Cobb to remain good law, it noted that Mitsubishi
should be properly confined to its context of international
commercial transactions. Additionally, the court reasoned
that nothing which occurred subsequent to Mitsubishi
compelled them to change this position. Furthermore, the
court concluded that the inherent conflict between effective
antitrust enforcement and private arbitration mandated that
antitrust disputes continue to be inarbitrable in the
domestic context. On rehearing en banc, however, the
Eleventh Circuit held that "in light of Mitsubishi and its
progeny, as well as the persuasive authority from our sister
circuits, ... arbitration agreements concerning domestic
antitrust claims are enforceable". 87
Obviously, there is a growing trend toward the
arbitrability of statutory disputes and it seems only a
matter of time before all the circuits embrace the view that
Mitsubishi makes all antitrust disputes, domestic and
international, arbitrable where those disputes fall within
the parties' agreement to arbitrate. Nevertheless, there
remains an inherent and inescapable tension between the
underlying policies of antitrust law and private
Thomas J. Brewer, supra note 61, at 105; Eric James Fuglsang,
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arbitration. Further, the possibility of having different
standards of enforceability in the various circuits or
districts would not be conducive to business planning and
commercial relations. There is obviously a need for a
uniform standard within the federal judiciary regarding this
issue, especially in light of the growing globalization of
the marketplace, in which parties from widely divergent
areas desire to enter into commercial relationship governed
by a single set of rules. 88
Should the Supreme Court have to decide the issue, it
should give conclusive weight to the freedom of the parties
to contract to choose arbitration as the forum and means by
which all disputes, including domestic antitrust claims,
must be resolved. This reasoning is far more persuasive
than the antiquated views expressed in American Safety. 8
supra note 54, at 807
Eric James Fuglsang, supra note 54, at 80i
-
-
Joseph T. Mclaughlin, supra note 47, at 937
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C. Securities
1) Doctrine of Non-Arbitrability
of Securities Disputes
The most well recognized arbitration exception was for
claims arising under the Securities Act of 1933 9C
(hereinafter "Securities Act") . Indeed, this is the only
exception which has been expressly recognized by the Supreme
Court, finding in the anti-waiver provision of the
Securities Act a general limitation on the FAA. 91
In response to the devastating stock market crash of
1929, at the President's urging, Congress enacted the
Securities Act, in order to protect the investor. Congress,
in the Securities Act, has legislatively mandated that
parties may not waive their rights to judicial proceedings
through private agreements. Section 14 voids any waiver of
the act's provisions. Section 12(2) provides that a misled
or defrauded purchaser of securities may sue for damages.
Section 22(a) allows suit in any state or federal court of
competent jurisdiction and provides for nationwide service
of process. 92
90 15 U.S.C. § 77A (1982)
91 Stephen P. Bedell et al . , supra note 5, at 10; Jeffrey W.
Stempel, supra note 5, at 1415
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In Wilko v. Swan 9-5 , the purchaser of securities sued a
brokerage firm to recover damages under the Section 12(2) of
the Securities Act for misrepresentation and omission of
material facts made in inducing a sale of stock. The
defendant moved to stay litigation and compel arbitration in
accordance with the parties' arbitration agreement. The
contract between the purchaser and the seller contained an
arbitration clause that ordinarily would have made the FAA
applicable. 94 The U.S. Supreme Court, taking the provisions
together, concluded that an arbitration clause would
constitute a stipulation waiving the provisions of the
Securities Act which grant a special right to sue in any
court of competent jurisdiction. Recognizing the two
policies (favoring arbitration and protecting the investor)
are not easily reconcilable, the court concluded that the
intention of Congress concerning the sale of securities is
better carried out by holding invalid such agreement for
arbitration of issues arising under the Act and ruled that
judicial settlement of securities claims supplants the
policy of the FAA. 95
' Michael F. Hoellering, supra note 16, at 132; Stephen P. Bedell
et al
.
, supra note 5, at 10
93 Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427 (1953)
94 Michael R. Voorhees, supra note 5, at 69; Lisa M. Ferri, supra
note 8, at 457
Stephen P. Bedell et al., supra note 5, at 10; Michael F.
Hoellering, supra note 16, at 133
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Lower federal courts consistently extended the Wilko
reasoning to claims arising under the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934 96 (hereinafter "Exchange Act"), holding such
claims to be non-arbitrable. Often, courts simply assumed
that the holding in Wilko applied to the Exchange Act as
well. 97
2) Arbitration of Securities Issues
in International Transactions
Scherk v. Alberto-Culver 98 involved a United States
cosmetic company (Alberto-Culver Co.) that purchased from a
German citizen, Fritz Scherk, three European cosmetic
enterprises owned by him and organized under the laws of
Germany and Liechtenstein, together with all trademark
rights of these enterprises. The sales agreement between
the parties contained a clause by which Scherk warranted
that the trademarks for the cosmetics were unencumbered and
96 15 U.S.C. § 78J (1982)
Surman v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 733 F.2d 59,
61 (8 th Cir. 1984) ("Lower courts have ... held with consistency
that Wilko applies equally to claims arising under the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 or regulations promulgated thereunder.") See
also, Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith v. Moore, 590 F.2d
823 (10 th Cir. 1978); Weissbuch v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner &
Smith, 558 F.2d 831 (7 th Cir. 1977); Ayres v. Merrill Lynch,
Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 538 F.2d 532 (3 rd Cir. 1976), cert,
denied, 429 U.S. 1010 (1977); Sibley v. Tandy Corp., 543 F.2d 540
(5 th Cir. 1976), cert, denied, 434 U.S. 824 (1986)
98 Scherk v. Alberto-Culver, 417 U.S. 506 (1974)
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that "any controversy or claim that shall arise out of this
agreement or the breach thereof" would be referred to
arbitration before the International Chamber of Commerce in
Paris, France. Contending that Scherk' s fraudulent
representations concerning the status of the trademark
rights constitutes violation of the Exchange Act, Alberto-
Culver commenced an action for damages and other relief in
United States District Court. The district court, relying
entirely on Wilko v. Swan, held that an agreement to
arbitrate could not preclude a buyer of a security from
seeking a judicial remedy under the Securities Act. The
United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
affirmed on the same grounds. However, the Supreme Court
reversed the lower courts' decisions."
The Court noted that the anti-waiver provision of the
two acts were virtually identical in scope when applied to
the issue of arbitrability . However, the court
distinguished Wilko from Scherk on the basis that a "truly
international agreement" was involved and held that Exchange
Act claims arising out of international transactions are
arbitrable, notwithstanding the uniform rule that domestic
claims are non-arbitrable. The Supreme Court reasoned that
considerations of international comity and commercial
predictability outweighed the solicitude for the individual
99 Michael R. Voorhees, supra note 5, at 73
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investor underlying the Wilko doctrine. The Court stated
that, in a international context, "the advantages these
provisions might afford a party are chimerical because a
parochial refusal ... to enforce an international arbitration
agreement ... would invite unseemly and mutually destructive
jockeying by the party to secure tactical litigation
advantages". Furthermore, the Court declared that "to
determine that ^American standards of fairness' ... must
nonetheless govern the controversy demeans the standards of
justice elsewhere in the world, and unnecessarily exalt the
primacy of the United States law over the laws of other
countries". The Court also made some reservations about the
domestic practice of applying Wilko to claims brought under
the Exchange Act. 100
Though faced with statutory provisions similar to those
faced by the Court in Wilko, the Scherk Court reached a
different conclusion. It did so not by downgrading the
general importance of the Securities Acts, but by showing
that national public policy may lose much of its rationale
and force in an international context. The Court broadly
construed the international public policy considerations
underlying arbitration. 101
Stephen P. Bedell et al., supra note 5, at 12; Michael F.
Hoellering, supra note 16, at 134; Lisa M. Ferri, supra note 8,
at 461; Ronald E. M. Goodman, supra note 105, at 665
101 Ronald E. M. Goodman, supra note 105, at 665
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The majority went on to hold that the policies favoring
enforcement of international agreements to arbitrate
outweighed the policies underlying the anti-waiver
provisions of the Securities Acts. In The Bremen v. Zapata
Qff-Shore Co. 102 , the Supreme Court referred to a case
involving a court selection clause. A contract was entered
between a German corporation (Unterweser) and an American
corporation (Zapata) for the towing of the off-shore
drilling rig of Zapata, from Louisiana to Italy. The
contract contained a provision that "any dispute arising
must be treated before the London Court of Justice". After
an accident occurred at sea, the drilling rig was brought to
Florida and Zapata sued Unterweser' s vessel (M/S Bremen) in
the United States District Court for breach of contract.
Unterweser moved to dismiss or stay the suit and sued Zapata
in the High Court of Justice in London. Both the District
Court and the Court of Appeals declined to dismiss the suit
and order litigation in a United States District Court. 103
On appeal, in the Bremen case, the Supreme Court
vacated the Court of Appeals' judgment and remanded the
case. The Court held that "the choice of forum was made in
an arm' s length negotiation by experienced and sophisticated
businessmen, and absent some compelling and countervailing
- o: The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1 (1964)
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reason it should be honored by the parties and enforced by
the courts".' In its analysis, the Court emphasized the
importance of contract obligations and commercial
interdependence. The Court observed that a refusal to
compel arbitration would reflect a "parochial concept that
all disputes must be resolved under our laws and in our
courts ... We cannot have trade and commerce in world markets
and international waters exclusively on our terms, governed
by our laws, and resolved in our courts". On this basis the
Supreme Court had felt that international public policy
considerations outweighed those of national public policy 105 .
3) Mitsubishi reasoning applicable
to the domestic context
In Byrd"" 00 , the Court, for the second time 107 , expressed
doubt on the refusal of many courts to enforce arbitration
103 Michael R. Voorhees, supra note 5, at 72; Lisa M. Ferri, supra
note 8, at 459
1
~~ Sharon L. Cloud, Mitsubishi and the Arbitrahility of Antitrust
Claims: Did the Supreme Court Throw the Baby out with the
Bathwater?, 18 Law & Pol'y Int'l Bus. 341, 353 (1986)
Michael F. Hoellering, supra note 16, at 135; Lisa M. Ferri,
supra note 8, at 460; Ronald E. M. Goodman, Arbitrability and
Antitrust: Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, 23
Colum. J. Transnat'l L. 655, 678 (1985)
106 Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 726 F.2d 552 (9th Cir.
1984), rev'd, 105 S. Ct. 1238 (1985)
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agreements as to claims arising under the Exchange Act
.
10f
Since that case, the majority of district courts deciding on
the arbitrability of claims arising under the Exchange Act,
have ordered arbitration, finding that Wilko could not be
analogized to the Exchange Act in light of both Byrd and
Scherk. 109
Other courts, however, have refused to follow the lead
suggested by Byrd. A number of district courts have
continued to hold that such claims are not arbitrable unless
the Supreme Court squarely holds the practice to be
violative of the FAA. 110
In Shearson/American Express Inc. v. McMahon'", where
plaintiffs sued their stockbroker alleging various
violations of the Exchange Act, the Second Circuit,
In Scherk, the Court already made some reservations about: the
domestic practice of applying Wilko to claims brought under the
Exchange Act.
" e Stephen P. Bedell et al., supra note 5, at 13
See Moncrieff v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith 623 F.
Supp. 1005, 1008 (E.D. Mich. 1985) ("stating that the
overwhelming majority of the lower federal courts have accepted
the court's invitation in Byrd and have ordered arbitration of
claims under the Exchange Act."); Finkle and Ross v. A.G. Becker
Paribas, Inc., 622 F. Supp. 1505, 1509 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (the court
joins "the growing ranks of district courts that have held that
arbitration agreements are not void as to claims under the 1934
Act . "
)
Stephen P. Bedell et al . , supra note 5, at 13-14; See, e.g.,
Scharp v. Cralin & Co., 617 F. Supp. 476, 479 (S.D. Fla. 1985)
(following the rule that claims under the 1934 Act are not
arbitrable "until overruled by the United States Supreme Court or
the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
sitting en banc")
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distinguished Mitsubishi by limiting it only to the
international arena. Indeed, apparently choosing to
disregard much of the Supreme Court's opinion, the Second
Circuit announced that "the reasoning of our decision in
American Safety ... was not disputed in Mitsubishi as applied
to agreements to arbitrate arising from domestic
transactions". 112 Based in part on this assertion, the
Second Circuit held that arbitration agreements covering
Exchange Act claims are unenforceable. 113
The U.S. Supreme Court promptly reversed, stating that
"although the holding in Mitsubishi was limited to the
international context, much of its reasoning is equally
applicable here". It discarded expressly the distinction
between domestic and international transactions in holding
that purely domestic Exchange Act claims may now be
arbitrated as well. The FAA establishes a "federal policy
favoring arbitration", requiring that "we rigorously enforce
agreements to arbitrate". This duty to enforce arbitration
agreements is not diminished when a party bound by an
agreement raises a claim founded on statutory rights.
However, like any statutory directive, the FAA' s mandate may
be overridden by a contrary congressional command. The
111 Shearson/American Express Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220 (1987)
112 McMahon v. Shearson/American Express Inc., 788 F.2d 94, at 98
(2d Cir. 1986), rev' d 482 U.S. 220 (1987)
113 Thomas J. Brewer, supra note 61, at 100
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burden is on the party opposing arbitration to show the
Congress' intention discernible from the text, history, or
purposes of the statute. The Court found no congressional
intent to create an exception to the FAA for such claims and
stated that the Exchange Act only prohibits waiver of the
Acts' substantive obligation, not its procedural
obligations
.
114
The Supreme Court addressed a similar issue in
Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc. 115
,
except that Rodriguez concerned a violation of the
Securities Act, and overruled Wilko. Plaintiffs opened a
brokerage account with Shearson/American Express. Their
customer agreement contained a clause, standard among
brokerage firms, stating that the parties agreed to settle
any controversies by arbitration. Plaintiffs sued under the
1933 Act after their investments became unprofitable.
The Court held that Wilko was "incorrectly decided and
is inconsistent with the prevailing uniform construction of
other federal statutes governing arbitration agreements in
the setting of business transactions". The 1933 Act and the
1934 Act should be construed harmoniously and therefore,
predispute agreements to arbitrate claims under the 1933 Act
must be upheld. Justice Kennedy's opinion noted that the
114 Id. at 100; Joseph T. Mclaughlin, supra note 47, at 909
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Court's decision in Wilko was permeated by the "old judicial
hostility to arbitration". This hostility was clearly
eroded by subsequent decisions. Additionally, the
Securities Act does not specifically require a judicial
forum, nor does the policy of protecting purchasers of
securities prevent the disputes from being arbitrated. 110
D. Bankruptcy
1) Bankruptcy Court's Discretion
The bankruptcy area has also engendered substantial
disagreement over the enforceability of arbitration
agreement. Courts have split over the enforceability of
arbitration clauses in this context. Since the adoption of
the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 (hereinafter "Bankruptcy
Code"), five cases prior to Zimmerman (cf. infra) have been
reported that involve related actions in a bankruptcy case
arising from contracts containing arbitration clauses
governed by the FAA. These decisions have not been
consistent
.
117
" Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express Inc., 490
U.S. 477 (1989)
U6 Joseph T. Mclaughlin, supra note 47, at 910; Eric James
Fuglsang, supra note 54, at 792
* 17 Barber-Greene Co. v. Zeco Co., 17 Bankr. 248 (Bankr. D. Minn.
1982); Hart Ski Manufacturing Co. v. Maschinefabrik Hennecke, 711
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The issue of the arbitrability of disputes arising in
federal bankruptcy cases creates a conflict between two
competing statutory policies. On one hand, there is a
strong federal presumption in favor of arbitration, on the
other hand, there is a strong federal bankruptcy policy of
resolving all disputes involving the debtor in one forum. 118
A primary consideration underlying the enactment of the
Bankruptcy Code was the perceived inefficiency created by
jurisdictional restrictions of prior bankruptcy laws. Those
laws, by limiting the bankruptcy courts' jurisdiction to a
summary jurisdiction, often caused delay, expense, and
repetitive litigation. 119 Through the Bankruptcy Code,
Congress sought to protect the positions of both the
bankrupt and its creditors by creating a framework whereby
all claims and issues relevant to bankruptcy actions should
F.2d 845 (8' r ' Cir. 1983); Cross Electric Co. v. John Driggs Co., 9
Bankr. 408 (Bankr. W.D. Va . 1981); Morgan v. Bender Shipbuilding
& Repair Co., 28 Bankr. 3 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1983), appeal docketed,
No. 83-1818 (9 cn Cir. Mar. 22, 1983); Coar v. Brown, 29 Bankr. 806
(Bankr. N.D. 111. 1983)
118 Stephen P. Bedell et al., supra note 5, at 22; Joseph T.
Mclaughlin, supra note 47, at 937
119 See S. Rep. No. 989, 95"" Cong., 2d Sess. 17-18, reprinted in
1978 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 5787, 5803-04 illustrating the
intent of Congress in enacting the Bankruptcy Code: "A major
impetus underlying this reform legislation has been the need to
enlarge jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court in order to
eliminate the serious delays, expense and duplications associated
with the current dichotomy between summary and plenary
jurisdiction, a wasteful remnant of the referee system left over
from the pre-Chandler Act era."; Trost & King, Congress and
Bankruptcy Reform Circa 1977, 33 Bus. Law 489, 497-98 (1978);
Brian D. Kennedy, The Bankruptcy Court Under the New Bankruptcy
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be resolved in one expeditious proceeding. Delay is
particularly prejudicial in a commercial bankruptcy case
because of its effect on the rehabilitation of a company in
financial trouble as well as its effect on the devaluation
of assets in the course of a liquidation. In order to
accomplish this goal, Congress significantly expanded the
bankruptcy courts' formerly summary jurisdiction with a
broad jurisdictional grant to hear any claims arising in
connection with bankruptcy proceedings. 120
In Zimmerman v. Continental Airlines, Inc. 121
, the
Ludwig Honold Manufacturing Company (the company) entered
into an agreement with Continental Airline, Inc. (the
airline) in which the company agreed to supply the airline
with four plane-mate vehicles. The contract contained a
clause providing that, in the event of late delivery, the
airline would be entitled to liquidated damages. The
agreement also included an arbitration clause. Delays in
delivery occurred, and, pursuant to the liquidated damages
provision, the airline withheld $200,000 of the contract
Law: Its Structure and Jurisdiction, 55 Am. Bankr. L.J. 63, 84-86
(1981)
i20 Stephen P. Bedell et al., supra note 5, at 22; Michael F.
Hoellering, supra note 16, at 138; Carolyn C. MarKason,
Bankruptcy Law - Arbitration Agreements in Bankruptcy
Proceedings : The Clash Between Policies and the Proper Forum for
Resolution - Zimmerman v. Continental Airlines , Inc., 112 F.2d 55
(3d Cir. 1983), cert, denied, 104 S. Ct. 699 (1984), 57 Temp.
L.Q. 855, 855 (1984)
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price. The company filed for bankruptcy and a trustee, Fred
Zimmerman, was appointed. Zimmerman initiated an action
against the airline in bankruptcy court alleging that the
airline was not entitled to the amount withheld. The
airline applied for a stay of the bankruptcy proceeding.
The bankruptcy court denied the airline's application,
basing its decision upon the Bankruptcy Code and the need
for the expeditious resolution of bankruptcy proceedings.
The airline appealed. 122
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
acknowledged that the express provisions of the two Acts,
the FAA and the Bankruptcy Code, created a jurisdictional
conflict when read together. Therefore, rather than
concentrating on the language of the statutes, the court
chose to concentrate on their purposes and goals to resolve
the controversy. The court noticed that the stay
reguirements of the FAA indicate that Congress intended the
arbitration procedure to be "speedy and not subject to delay
and obstruction in the courts". It also determined that
Congress, in implementing the Bankruptcy Code, had been
primarily concerned with the division between summary and
plenary jurisdiction in the original bankruptcy laws. This
121 Zimmerman v. Continental Airlines, 712 F.2d 55 (3 r=i Cir. 1983),
cert, denied, 104 S. Ct . 699 (1984)
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division had subjected bankruptcy proceedings to serious
delay, increased expense, and repetitive litigation. The
court determined that the stay requirement of the FAA could
produce those same problems that had been experienced in the
original bankruptcy laws. The delay and expense caused by-
applying the requirements of the FAA to a bankruptcy
proceeding is contrary to the goals of both Acts and to the
very intention of the parties who have chosen a contractual
arbitration agreement to avoid expensive and time-consuming
litigation. The court concluded that congressional intent,
regarding the prompt settlement of bankruptcy proceedings
and the efficient operation of business activities, would be
more effectively effectuated by interpreting the Bankruptcy
Code as implicitly modifying the mandatory stay provisions
of the FAA.
The Court of Appeals, in Zimmerman, further held that
while a bankruptcy court has the power to stay a bankruptcy
proceeding pending arbitration, the use of that power is
left to the discretion of the bankruptcy judge. i2j Thus,
once an action in bankruptcy is filed, all other actions,
including arbitration, are automatically stayed. Rather
than act as a bar to arbitration, however, this stay allows
Anthony G. Buzbee, When Arbitrable Claims are Mixed with
Nonarbitrable Ones: What's a Court to Do?, 39 S. Tex. L. Rev.
663, 680 & 90 (1998); Carolyn C. MarKason, supra note 120, at 857
123 Zimmerman, 712 F.2d at 59-60
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the bankruptcy court, in its discretion, to decide whether
arbitration should go forward. The court reasoned that it
could not reverse the bankruptcy court's decision because it
did not find an abuse of discretion in denying the stay
application. The court therefore affirmed the lower court
order and denied the requested stay pending arbitration."" 24
2) Arbitrability of Bankruptcy Issues
in International Transactions
Ever since the Scherk decision, the vast majority of
bankruptcy courts have enforced arbitration clauses in
international commercial contract. 125
In Societe Nationale Algerienne (Sonatrach) v.
Distrigas Corp. 1 ^ , Distrigas, a Massachusetts natural gas
distributor, was in liquidation, having failed to achieve a
reorganization under Chapter 11. After filing for
Stephen P. Bedell et al . , supra note 5, at 22; Michael F.
Hoellering, supra note 16, at 138; Carolyn C. MarKason, supra
note 120, at 856-62
Fred Neufeld, Enforcement of Contractual Arbitration
Agreements under the Bankruptcy Code, 65 Am. Bank. J.L. 525, 553
(1991); Joseph T. Mclaughlin, supra note 47, at 938; See, e.g.,
Hart Ski Mfg. Co. v. Maschinefabrik Hennecke, 711 F.2d 845 (8 cn
Cir. 1983); Mor-Ben Insurance Markets Corp. v. Excess Insurance
Co., 73 B.R. 644 (9 Ln Cir. BAP 1987); 0. Mustad & Sons v. Seawest
Industries, Inc., 73 B.R. 946 (Bankr. W.D. Wash. 1987)
1 Societe Nationale Algerienne Pour La Recherche, La Production,
Le Transport, La Transformation et La Commercialisation des
Hydrocarbures v. Distrigas Corp., 80 B.R. 606 (Bankr. D. Mass.
1987)
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bankruptcy protection, it rejected its twenty-year oil
supply contract with Sonatrach, an Algerian natural gas
supplier. The arbitration clause in the contract provided
for arbitration before the International Chamber of Commerce
in Geneva, Switzerland. Sonatrach moved in the bankruptcy
court for an order compelling arbitration of the issue of
damages resulting from the rejection of the contract. The
bankruptcy court refused to order arbitration, but the
district court reversed. 127
The U.S. District Court for the District of
Massachusetts held that the arbitration clause is severable
and binding regardless of the debtor's rejection of the
underlying contract and that public policy considerations
should not prevent the arbitration. The court noted that
"few courts have focused upon the precise interplay between
bankruptcy policy and the policy favoring international
arbitration". After reviewing a trilogy of Supreme Court
decisions, Zapata, Scherk and Mitsubishi, the District Court
concluded:
Taken together, these decisions erect a compelling
argument in favor of reguiring Distrigas to honor
its bargain and proceed with international
arbitration. Although the Supreme Court has not
specifically addressed the clash of bankruptcy and
international arbitration, it would be unrealistic
indeed to argue that bankruptcy principles are
quantitatively more fundamental to our
127 Jeremy J.O. Harwood, Bankruptcy Arbitration and the Unwilling
Debtor, 48-DEC Disp. Resol. J. 28, 35 (1993); Fred Neufeld, supra
note 125, at 555
58
capitalistic democratic system than either the
securities laws or anti-trust policy. 128
3) Impact of the BAFJA on the Arbitrability
of Bankruptcy Issues
In 1984, the Bankruptcy Code was significantly amended
by the Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act 129
(hereinafter "BAFJA") , which established a narrower grant of
jurisdiction to the bankruptcy courts. The BAFJA
distinguishes between civil proceedings arising under the
Bankruptcy Code, which are deemed "core" matters, and civil
proceedings related to the Bankruptcy Code which are deemed
"non-core" matters.
A core proceeding has been defined as one involving a
right created by federal bankruptcy law and which would only
arise in bankruptcy (e.g., preference actions and automatic
stay) . A non-core proceeding is defined as civil proceeding
which could have been brought in a federal or state court in
the absence of a bankruptcy petition (e.g., breach of
contract claims, actions to collect on pre-petition accounts
receivable and actions to enforce promissory notes). 13
Robert B. vonMehren, New Areas for International Commercial
Arbitration, All PLI/Comm 159, 168 (1988); Fred Neufeld, supra
note 125, at 555; Joseph T. Mclaughlin, supra note 47, at 938
129 Pub. L. No. 98-353, 98 Stat. 346
130 Fred Neufeld, supra note 125, at 528
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Under 28 U.S.C.A. § 157, the bankruptcy court may hear
non-core matters, but, absent consent of the parties, cannot
enter orders. Instead, it submits proposed findings of fact
and conclusions of law to the district court. Upon timely
objection by any party, the district court must conduct a de
novo review of the matter. On the other hand, a bankruptcy
court may hear and determine all core proceedings and enter
final orders. 131
In Hays & Co. v. Merril Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith,
Inc. 132 , the trustee of the bankrupt corporation, Hays & Co.,
filed a claim against the corporation's securities broker,
Merrill Lynch, in the federal court alleging that the broker
had mishandled the debtor' s accounts and consequently
violated federal and state securities laws. The broker
moved to compel arbitration. The district court denied the
demand, notwithstanding that the claims arose from brokerage
agreements containing an arbitration clause. It concluded,
based on Zimmerman decision, that it had the discretion to
nullify an arbitration clause. 133
The Third Circuit said that Zimmerman was no longer
good law and, held that the district court had no authority
or discretion to deny enforcement of the arbitration
131 Id. at 528
Hays & Co. v. Merril Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 885
F.2d 1149 (3d Cir. 1989)
133 Jeremy J.O. Harwood, supra note 127, at 35
60
agreement because the trustee had failed to meet his "burden
of showing that the text, legislative history, or purpose of
the Bankruptcy Code conflicts with the enforcement of an
arbitration clause". The court based its decision on
McMahon where the Supreme Court began with a review of the
intention of the FAA and concluded that "this duty to
enforce arbitration agreements is not diminished when a
party bound by an agreement raises a claim founded on
statutory rights". The only consideration existing against
enforcement of an arbitration of statutory claims in such
circumstances would be if the party opposing arbitration
could show a clear congressional intention not to permit
limitation or waiver of the court's jurisdiction over such
statutory claims. Such intention could be deduced from the
statute itself or its legislative history.
This is an important decision mandating that
arbitration agreements will be enforced, since it is
unlikely that any trustee will be able to show that the
policies behind the Bankruptcy Code "trump" those contained
in the FAA. 134 A review of the Bankruptcy Code and its
legislative history provided the court with no indication
that an exception had been made by the Bankruptcy Code to
the statutory direction in the FAA that arbitration
agreements be enforced. The trustee's final argument that
134 Joseph T. Mclaughlin, supra note 47, at 931
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"bankruptcy policy ... must override the policy favoring
arbitration" was rejected because, in the court's view, the
BAFJA manifests a congressional dilution of the bankruptcy
court's jurisdiction over all bankruptcy related matters. A
court arguably could find, like it was the case in
Zimmerman, in the jurisdictional scheme before the BAFJA an
intent by Congress to preclude enforcement of arbitration
clause in the bankruptcy context, because that scheme
involved a Congressional policy to consolidate all
bankruptcy matters in the bankruptcy court. But, with the
BAFJA, some bankruptcy related proceedings will be heard
outside the bankruptcy court anyway135 . The court concluded:
"We can no longer subscribe to a hierarchy of congressional
concerns that places the bankruptcy law in a position of
superiority over the Arbitration Act". 136
Despite the Hays decision, most of the courts 137
,
relying on Zimmerman, still consider that they have the
discretion to decide whether or not to compel arbitration.
We must conclude that, although the Hays decision is a step
in the right direction and is consistent with the modern
Ja See 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 157 & 1334
36 Fred Neufeld, sup
supra note 127, at 36
137 See In re FRG, Inc
P. Young Co., Ill B.R. 410 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1990
ra note 125, at 540; Jeremy J.O. Harwood,
., 115 B.R. 72 (E.D. Pa. 1990); In re Chas
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Supreme Court jurisprudence, a clear rule for enforcing
arbitration clauses in bankruptcy is required. 138
138 Jeremy J.O. Harwood, supra note 12 7, at 28 & 7 9
Chapter III
Waiver
A. Choice of Law Provision
While the FAA preempts any state law that infringes
upon or restricts a valid arbitration agreement, the
question remained whether arbitration agreements containing
a choice of law provision evidence an intent on the part of
the parties to apply a state law that conflicts with the
FAA' s broad policy of enforcement. In other words, was the
conflicting state law preempted by the FAA, as would be the
case absent the choice of law clause, or did the generic
choice of law provision operate to incorporate the anti-
arbitration state law into agreement? 139
Generally, courts concluded that choice of law
provisions in a contract governed by the FAA merely
designated the substantive law that arbitrators must apply,
but did not deprive the arbitrators of their authority to
award a particular remedy (i.e. punitive damage). 140
Michael A. Hanzman, Arbitration Agreements: Analyzing
Threshold Choice of Law and Arbitrability Questions : An Often
Overlooked Task, 70-DEC Fla. B.J. 14, 18 (1996)
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The Supreme Court first addressed this issue in Volt
Info. Sciences, Inc. v. Board of Trustees of Leland Stanford
Junior Univ . 141 The parties entered into a construction
contract for the installation of a system of electrical
conduits in the appellee's college campus. The contract
contained an agreement to arbitrate all disputes between the
parties arising out of, or relating to, the contract or the
breach thereof, as well as a choice of law clause providing
that the agreement would be governed by the law of the place
where the project was located, which was California. 142
The California Court of Appeals held that by specifying
that their contract would be governed by the law of the
place where the project was located, the parties had
incorporated the California rules of arbitration into their
agreement. Since the purpose of the FAA was to provide for
the enforcement of privately negotiated arbitration
agreement, the California court concluded that federal law
did not have preemptive effect in a case where the parties
had chosen in their arbitration agreement to abide by state
rules of arbitration. The U.S. Supreme Court agreed. 14 '
140 Id. at 18; See Bonar v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 835 F.2d
1378 (11 th Cir. 1988)
Volt Info. Sciences, Inc. v. Board of Trustees of Leland
Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 109 S. Ct . 1248 (1989)
142 Michael A. Hanzman, supra note 139, at 18
143 Volt, 489 U.S. 468, 109 S. Ct. 1248 (1989)
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Seizing upon Volt, which by implication rejected the
substantive law limitation, litigants have persuaded certain
courts that a general choice of law clause evidenced the
parties' intent to incorporate a given state's complete body
of law, including statutes and case law governing the
arbitration process and restricting the authority of
arbitrators to award particular relief. 144
Other courts have disagreed and have continued to look
to general federal law to decide the scope of an arbitration
panel's authority, notwithstanding the presence of a choice
of law provision. 145
In Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc. 146 , the
U.S. Supreme Court was presented with a securities trading
account contract specifying that it would "be governed by
the laws of the State of New York". The respondents argued
that this clause incorporated New York' s rule prohibiting
arbitrators from awarding punitive damages and thereby
divested the arbitration panel of authority to enter such an
award. The arbitration panel disagreed and issued a
punitive damage award. 147
144 Michael A. Hanzman, supra note 139, at 20; See, e.g., Barbier
v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 948 F.2d 117 (2d Cir. 1991)
x4:> Michael A. Hanzman, supra note 139, at 20; See Raytheon Co. v.
Automated Business Sys., 882 F.2d 6 (l sz Cir. 1989); Lee v. Chica,
983 F.2d 883 (8th Cir. 1993)
146 Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 115 S. Ct . 1212
(1995)
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The Supreme Court held that when contracting parties
agree to arbitrate all claims, including claims for punitive
damages, the FAA ensures that their agreement will be
enforced according to its terms, even if a rule of state law
would otherwise exclude such claims from arbitration. The
Court then proceeded to resolve the issue through common law
contract interpretation analysis and concluded that the
contract did not express an intent to preclude an award of
punitive damages. 148
B. Loss of the Right to Arbitrate
A party who provides for arbitration in a contractual
provision may lose the right to arbitrate by failing to act
in accordance with the arbitration agreement. Waiver may
occur in several ways, thus destroying the arbitrability of
a given dispute: by initiation of a court action in
violation of the agreement, by failure to object to the
initiation of court proceedings by the other party, or by
delay or failure to perform the necessary steps leading to
arbitration. 149
14
' Michael A. Hanzman, supra note 139, at 20
148 Id. at 20
149 Michael F. Hoellering, supra note 16, at 139
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However, the courts, being reluctant to find waiver,
have created numerous of exceptions
.
15C Courts will thus
carefully examine the facts in each case. Factors that may
be considered relevant to the waiver issue are whether the
party seeking to compel arbitration was dilatory in seeking
arbitration, coupled with the gaining of undue advantages in
the judicial forum or other substantial prejudice to the
opposing party or any other action taken by the moving party
inconsistent with his seeking arbitration. 151
150 See, e.g., Belke v. Merill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 693
F.2d 1023 (11 th Cir. 1982) (failure to move to compel arbitration
at the commencement of an action did not constitute a waiver of
arbitration); General Guar, Ins. Co. v. New Orleans Gen., Agency,
Inc., 427 F.2d 924 (5 :n Cir. 1970) (conducting discovery in
litigation does not itself constitute waiver)
151 Michael F. Hoellering, supra note 16, at 140; Jeffrey W.
Stempel, supra note 5, at 1403; Weight Watchers of Quebec, LTD.
v. Weight Watchers Int' 1 LTD., 398 F. Supp. 1057 (E.D.N.Y. 1975)
(the court stressed that the absence of one or more of these
factors would support a conclusion of no waiver)
Chapter IV
The Decision-Makers
on the Question of Arbitrability
A. Tension Between the Arbitrator and
the Court as Decision-Makers
The doctrine of competence-competence provides the
basis for arbitral autonomy, that is, the allocation of
authority between arbitrators and national court over the
interpretation and enforceability of arbitration agreement.
In essence, the doctrine authorizes arbitrators to determine
their own jurisdiction without requesting a judicial
decision. Law on this issue varies among nations and may
limit the doctrine by allowing for judicial review on an
arbitral award on its jurisdiction. 152
The Supreme Court decided in Atkinson v. Sinclair
Refining Co
.
153 that "under our decisions, whether or not the
company was bound to arbitrate, as well as what issues it
Conrad K. Harper, The Options in First Options: International
Arbitration and Arbitral Competence, 111 PLI/Comm 127, 129 (1998)
153 Atkinson v. Sinclair Refining Co., 370 U.S. 238 (1962)
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must arbitrate, is a matter to be determined by the court on
the basis of the contract entered into by the parties". The
Sinclair case involved a narrow arbitration clause providing
only for submission of grievances by employees, at the
option of the Union. 154
In Drake Bakeries Inc. v. Local 50, American Bakery &
Confectionary Workers International Union 150 , involving a
broad clause, although the court did not expressly
distinguish the effect of a broad clause on the initial
determination of arbitrability, it implied that summary
referral to arbitration was appropriate under such a clause,
even in the face of an arbitrability challenge. 156
The various Circuits have split on the interpretation
of this line of decisions. The Fifth Circuit, for example,
has stated that all questions of arbitrability are for the
arbitrator when it is clear that the parties chose
arbitration as the preferred forum." 5 ' By contrast, the
Sixth and Ninth Circuits have held that questions of
arbitrability are for the courts only. 158 Whether an
Michael F. Hoellering, supra note 16, at 143
Drake Bakeries, Inc. v. Local 50, America Bakery &
Confectionary Workers International Union, 370 U.S. 254 (1962)
~ 5c Michael F. Hoellering, supra note 16, at 143
Local 787, Int' 1 Union of Electrical, Radio & Machine Workers
v. Collins Radio Co., 317 F.2d 214 (5" Cir. 1963)
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arbitration agreement is broad or narrow very often
determined who will decide on the arbitrability
.
159
Recently, the Supreme Court was called to decide this
question in First Option of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan 160 . In
this case, First Options of Chicago, a securities firm
trading on the Philadelphia Stock Exchange, sought
arbitration against its customers, Manuel and Carol Kaplan,
who were the sole shareholders of MK Investments (MKI) and
who refused to repay the debts of MKI incurred following the
stock market crash of 1987. The parties had structured the
debt repayment in four workout agreements. The action was
based on an arbitration clause contained in one of these
workout agreements, to which MKI, but not the Kaplans, was a
signatory. The three other workout agreements to which the
Kaplans were signatories did not contain an arbitration
agreement. The Kaplans objected to the arbitrators'
jurisdiction over them, since they had not signed any
agreement with an arbitration clause. The arbitral tribunal
rejected the Kaplan's argument that their dispute was not
arbitrable, deciding that it had jurisdiction over the
Kaplans in their individual capacities, and issued an award
Pacific Northwest Bell Tel. Co. v. Communications Workers
Union, 310 F.2d 244 (9 th Cir. 1962); Local 998, United Auto
Workers Union v. B&T Metals Co., 315 F.2d 432 (6th Cir. 1963)
xb9 Michael F. Hoellering, supra note 16, at 143
160 First Option of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 115 S.
Ct. 1920 (1995)
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against them on the merits. The federal district court
confirmed the award, but the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit reversed, holding that First Options' dispute
with the Kaplans was not arbitrable.
The U.S. Supreme Court affirmed. It said that the
question of arbitrability depends on whether the parties
agreed to submit the arbitrability question itself to
arbitration, and if they had not agreed to do so, the court
should decide the arbitrability question. In deciding
whether the parties agreed to arbitrate arbitrability,
"courts generally ... should apply ordinary state law
principles that govern the formation of contracts ... but
should not assume that the parties agreed to arbitrate the
issue of arbitrability unless there is 'clear and
unmistakable' evidence that they did so". The fact that the
Kaplans had argued the arbitrability issue with the
arbitrator did not indicate a clear willingness to be bound
by the arbitrator's decision on arbitrability. Since the
Kaplans did not clearly agree to submit the question of
arbitrability to arbitration, the arbitrator's decision was
subject to independent review by the courts. 161
The Court reasoned that law treats silence or ambiguity
about the question "who (primarily) should decide
Department Review of Court Decision Commercial, Courts Should
Decide Whether Party Agreed to Arbitrate, 50-SEP Disp. Resol. J.
91, 91 (1995); Conrad K. Harper, supra note 152, at 134
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arbitrability" differently from the way it treats silence or
ambiguity about the question "whether a particular merit-
related dispute is arbitrable because it is within the scope
of a valid arbitration agreement". 162
When addressing the latter question, the court engages
in presumption that any doubts concerning the scope of
arbitrable issues should be resolved in favor of
arbitration. In the former instance, the presumption is
reversed, thereby requiring clear and unmistakable evidence
that the parties intended to submit the arbitrability
question to arbitration. 163
The U.S. Supreme Court reasoned that if the parties
agreed to arbitrate some issues, they at least gave thought
to the latter question, the scope of arbitration. However,
the parties were less likely to have thought about the
former question, an issue of arbitral autonomy, and
therefore the presumption should be in favor of the
courts. 164
" 62 Michael A. Hanzman, supra note 139, at 23; Conrad K. Harper,
supra note 152, at 135
John L. Latham & Jenna L. Fruechtenicht , Securities
Regulation, 48 Mercer L. Rev. 1677, 1715 (1996); Michael A.
Hanzman, supra note 139, at 23
The most extreme deference to an arbitrator' s finding of
arbitrability occurs where a statute expresses a legislative
desire to supplant common law adjudication with arbitration and
the state divests a court of jurisdiction to enjoin arbitration;
see Brian D. Kennedy, An Arbitrator' s Jurisdiction to Determine
Arbitrability: Is the Arbitrator' s Jurisdiction to Decide
Arbitrability in the First Instance the Worst of Both Worlds?,
B. Standards Applied for Review
of Arbitration Awards
In First Option of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan~ c= , the
Supreme Court next addressed the standard with which a
district court should review an arbitration award, and with
which a court of appeals should review a district court's
decision confirming or refusing to vacate an arbitration
award. 166
When the decision-maker considers that the parties did
not agree to submit the arbitrability question itself tc
arbitration, the court should decide the question on the
merits like any other that the parties did not submit tc
arbitration. The Court adopted the Third Circuit's de novo
approach to review an arbitration award, expressly
disagreeing with the Eleventh Circuit's policy of applying a
particularly indulgent "abuse of discretion" standard to
both question of law and fact when a district court confirms
an arbitration award, but not when it sets this award
1996 J. Disp. Resol. 237, 241 (1996); Illinois and Pennsylvania
are a notable exception to the rule in the area of public labor
relations. See Board of Education of Warren Township High School
District 121 v. Warren Township High School Federation of
Teachers, 538 N.E.2d 524 (111. 1989); McLaughlin v. Chester
Upland School District, 655 A. 2d 621 (Pa. Cmmw. Ct . 1995); Conrad
K. Harper, supra note 152, at 135
First Option of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 936, 115 S.
Ct. 1920 (1995)
166 Anthony G. Buzbee, supra note 122, at 668
~4
aside. lc! The Court stated that ordinary standards of review
should be applied. Thus, findings of fact that are not
"clearly erroneous" should be accepted, but question of law
should be decided de novo. 10 *
When the decision-maker considers that the parties
agreed that the question of arbitrability was for the
arbitrator, then the court's standard for reviewing this
decision is the same as that for any other matter that the
parties agreed to arbitrate, giving substantial judicial
deference to the arbitrator's decision. In such a case, the
court will be hesitant to overturn the arbitrator'
s
decision, even when the issue is the arbitrability question
itself, and it will set aside the decision only in unusual
circumstances . ±69
Robbins v. Day, 954 F.2d 679, 681-82 (11 th Cir.), cert, denied
sub nom., Robbins v. Paine Webber, Inc., 506 U.S. 870 (1992)
168 John L. Latham & Jenna L. Fruechtenicht, supra note 163, at
1715; Anthony G. Buzbee, supra note 122, at 669 & 71
~ C ~J Anthony G. Buzbee, supra note 122, at 669 & 71; see Antwine v.
Prudential Bache Sec, Inc., 899 F.2d 410, 413 (5th Cir. 1990)
("Judicial review of an arbitration award is extraordinarily
narrow ..."); Delta Queen Steamboat Co. v. District 2 Marine Eng' rs
Beneficial Ass'n, 889 F.2d 599, 602 (5th Cir. 1989). Indeed, an
arbitration award should "not be vacated unless: (1) the award
was procured by corruption, fraud, or undue means; (2) there is
evidence of partiality or corruption among the arbitrators; (3)
the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct which prejudiced the
rights of one of the parties; or (4) the arbitrators exceed their
powers." Gateway Techs., Inc. v. MCI Telecomms. Corp., 64 F.3d
993 (5 tr Cir. 1995); see also Manville Forest Prods. Corp. v.
United Paperworkers Int' 1 Union, 831 F.2d 72, 74 (5th Cir. 1987)
(stating that a court reviews an arbitration award by asking
whether an arbitration award "stems from fraud or partiality; ...
Chapter V
Conclusion
In a line of cases culminating with McMahon and
Mitsubishi, the United States Supreme Court has prodded the
lower federal courts in the direction of strict enforcement
of arbitration clauses. Having made the bargain to
arbitrate, the party should be held to it unless Congress
itself has evinced an intention to preclude a waiver of
judicial remedies for the statutory rights at issue. In any
case, the Court's message is clear: the only legitimate
ground upon which to decline to enforce an arbitration
clause is the manifest congressional intention to the
contrary. Any other approach offends both the FAA and the
sanctity of the contract between the parties. Taken
together, these opinions suggest significant expansion in
the substantive scope of arbitration under federal
statutes. 170
concerns a matter not subject to arbitration under the contract;
... does not 'draw its essence' from the contract; or ... violates
public policy"); Forsythe Int'l, S.A. v. Gibbs Oil Co. of Tex.,
915 F.2d 1017, 1021 (5th Cir. 1990) (positing than an arbitration
award should be vacated if it is fundamentally unfair)
170 Stephen P. Bedell et al., supra note 5, at 2 & 16
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With the development of the recourse to arbitration and
the parallel decline in the efficiency of judicial
administration, the stature of the non-arbitrability defense
waned in some legal systems. In fact, areas fundamental to
the public interest and requiring exclusive judicial
jurisdiction are becoming fewer and more difficult to
identify. 171
The very problem which the Mitsubishi Court attempted
to resolve was the lack of consistency in application and
enforcement of choice-of-forum and choice-of-law in the
international context. The Court's response was to
establish a baseline posture for U.S. courts of enforcing
the parties' contractual provision for arbitration,
observing that judicial review was available to correct
abuses
.
172
The assumption that arbitrators will take into account
the public policy in the same manner as the national courts
is doubtful. Therefore, national courts must continue
thorough review of arbitral awards until there are
guarantees of the proper application of public policy in
arbitral forums. Unfortunately, this will diminish the
value of international arbitration as a dispute resolution
device. To reduce the probability of litigation at the
171 Thomas E. Carbonneau & Francois Janson, supra note 1, at 197
:7: Sharon L. Cloud, supra note 104, at 364-65
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enforcement stage, devices to introduce official positions
of public authorities into arbitration proceedings may be
helpful. 173
There is a distinction between non-arbitrability in its
application to domestic law and to matters of international
arbitration. Non-arbitrability in the domestic context is
usually more restrictive than its international counterpart
because the regulatory authority and interests of the state
are stronger domestically. In international arbitration,
the domestic imperatives underlying the legislation have a
reduced significance and function. 174
There are problems inherent in selectively enforcing
only some choice-of-forum provisions and not others.
Selective enforcement of such clauses only in international
situations means a separate and distinct application of the
same statute that covers both domestic and international
substantive antitrust issues. Will companies that do
business both domestically and internationally feel that
~ 13 Ludwig Von Zumbusch, supra note 61, at 327; Under the German
law, the civil court having jurisdiction over claims resulting
from the GWB is obliged, pursuant to section 90(1) GWB, to inform
the antitrust agency of any pending suit. This provision
increases the disclosure of trade restraints and the efficiency
of surveillance by the necessary authority. It has been suggested
that this provision should be applied to arbitral tribunal as
well. Under this proposal, arbitrators in whose proceedings
antitrust guestions become decisive would be obliged to inform
cartel authorities, thereby reducing reservations about
arbitration.
174 Id. at 197
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their economic freedom is protected equally in both cases?
On the other hand, to deny enforcement of arbitration
clauses in both domestic and international cases set up a
double standard for international business transactions
involving U.S. business entities and those of other
nations. Such a stance would imperil the willingness and
ability of businessmen to enter into international
commercial agreements. The prospect of a U.S. court's
refusal to honor a freely negotiated choice-of-forum
provision in favor of its assertion of exclusive
jurisdiction creates a significant disincentive for foreign
companies to do business with U.S. firms. 175
These development have been described aptly as a "sea-
change" in the court's attitudes towards arbitrability of
disputes arising under federal statutes. 176 This change has
important practical implications for parties drafting and
performing under commercial contracts. Indeed, parties to
existing contracts containing standard "all disputes"
arbitration clauses now may be compelled to arbitrate. Such
clauses may have been drafted long ago, at a time when the
parties had no inkling that the agreed-upon arbitration
provision could be applicable to disputes arising under
those federal statutes. Consequently, existing contracts
Sharon L. Cloud, supra note 104, at 366
79
should be reviewed to consider whether arbitration of
possible disputes is a result intended by the parties. 17,
A highly articulate expert in the field has summarized
the usefulness of international arbitration in a masterful
manner .Michael R. Voorhees wrote:
The most significant impact of international
commercial arbitration may be its contribution to
world peace and stability. It is largely through
commerce that modern nations maintain their day-
to-day relations. Even between countries with
antagonistic policies, trade continues.
International commerce may not directly avoid all
war, but it certainly creates interdependence and
balance. In present times, it is in world trade,
not politics, that arbitration is making its
greatest contribution to world peace. The
significance of international commercial
arbitration as a stimulus to world trade and peace
has been summed up simply as bringing prosperity,
security, freedom, and justice. 17e In view of this
worldwide impact, it was indeed with great
consideration that the Court in Mitsubishi gave to
^concerns of international comity, respect for the
capacities of foreign and transnational tribunals,
and sensitivity to the ... international commercial
system' . The decision of the Mitsubishi will not
hinder the on-going development of arbitration nor
will it hinder the possible effects arbitration
may have on achieving some economic order in the
, T_„i j 179world
.
Stephen L. Hayford, Commercial Arbitration in the Supreme
Court 1983-1995: A Sea-Change, 31 Wake Forest L. Rev. 1 (1996)
177 Thomas J. Brewer, supra note 61, at 92
Gardner, Economic and Political Implications of International
Commercial Arbitration, in Domke, International Trade Arbitration
15-26 (1958); Michael F. Hoellering, International Commercial
Arbitration: A Peaceful Method of Dispute Settlement, 40 Arb. J.
19, 26 (1985)
179 Michael R. Voorhees, supra note 5, at 89-90
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